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ABSTRACT: After contextualizing North Korea’s capacity for
belligerent rhetoric directed toward the United States and its northeast Asian allies, the author examines the contention that rhetoric
from Pyongyang represents a conflict escalation risk or even a casus
belli. The results of statistical tests indicate a negative correlation
between Pyongyang’s rhetoric and international diplomatic initiatives, but no correlation between North Korea’s verbal hostility and
its provocations.

A

dvances in North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile
programs mark a qualitative change in the threat to the United
States, South Korea, and Japan. Pyongyang’s ability to fit a
miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile or rocket and deliver the payload
is unproven, but many analysts argue that the capability is highly likely.1
This capability alone represents a risk to geopolitical stability in northeast
Asia as the region’s powers, including the United States, will struggle to
calibrate their responses to North Korea’s provocations. Additionally,
before, during, and after missile and nuclear tests in 2016, North Korea
employed belligerent rhetoric—in English for international influence—
that increased tension on the Korean peninsula particularly and in
northeast Asia generally.
These locutions—threats to annihilate American bases overseas,
turn Seoul into a sea of fire, and execute preemptive nuclear attacks
against perceived adversaries—are well-known. Bellicose rhetoric has
long been part of North Korea’s international communication, but the
combination of menacing words and capabilities to actuate the corresponding threats is new for long-range or nuclear attacks. In this vein,
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov remarked after the first set of
nuclear and missile tests in 2016 that Pyongyang’s bellicose rhetoric
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and the other fellows of the East-West Center for their feedback on this article. The author would
also like to thank all the participants of the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
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1     David Albright, “North Korean Miniaturization,” 38 North, February 13, 2013, http://38north politics in the Graduate
.org/2013/02/albright021313/; David Albright, Future Directions in the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons School of International
Program: Three Scenarios for 2020, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures, (Washington, DC: US-Korea and Area Studies,
Institute at SAIS, 2015); Dan Lamothe, “U.S. General: North Korea Likely Can Build Miniaturized Hankuk University
Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, October 24, 2014; Jeremy Bender, “Top Norad General: of Foreign Studies,
North Korea Has a Nuclear-Capable Missile That Can Hit the US,” Business Insider, April 10, 2015, Seoul, South Korea,
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-general-north-korea-has-nuclear-capable-missile-that-can researches East Asian
-hit-us-2015-4; Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Says North Has Capacity to Put Nuclear Warhead security dynamics, great
on a Missile,” New York Times, April 5, 2016; Jeffery Lewis, “Five Things You Need to Know about power diplomacy, and
Kim Jong Un’s Photo Op with the Bomb,” 38 North, March 11, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03 European foreign and
/jlewis031116/; and Lolita C. Baldor, “US Official Warns of North Korean Nuclear Capabilities,” security policy as applied
Associated Press, December 8, 2016.
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creates a legitimate casus belli for threatened states.2 The same week,
American intelligence agencies issued an assessment: “Threatening
rhetoric from Pyongyang . . . suggests North Korea is preparing for
a surprise military strike.”3 This statement acknowledges a connection
between North Korea’s hostile rhetoric and the country’s actions. These
interpretations of North Korean statements may appear alarmist, but
they are simply variations of analyses that Pyongyang’s rhetoric could
lead to miscalculation by actors on and around the Korean peninsula
and consequently escalation to war. Such claims appear frequently
in media reports, government declarations, and messages from the
international community, especially during and after periods of North
Korean provocation.
These statements assume North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric
means something; however, if the rhetoric fits no behavioral pattern,
then other countries’ populations, media, and governments should
discount the insults, threats, and crisis-mongering emanating from
Pyongyang. Consequently, these aggressive locutions would not function as sources for miscalculation and even less as a casus belli. In short,
is North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric cheap talk or a meaningful signal of
tangible events affecting tension on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia? After examining the background of North Korea’s recent
progress toward capabilities threatening the United States, South Korea,
and Japan, this article describes the mixed results of a study comparing
Pyongyang’s belligerent rhetoric to events involving North Korea and
major actors in northeast Asia and discusses the policy implications of
these findings.4

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

North Korea’s conventional arms are inferior to those of its
adversaries—the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The consensus
is North Korea would rapidly lose a conventional war against any combination of these alliance partners, and consequently, the Pyongyang
regime would fall quickly. Traditionally, North Korea has relied on two
strategic asymmetries to reduce this gap: a garrison-state sociopolitical
organization, with an armed force disproportionately large in comparison
to the state population and constructed to endure major attrition and therefore dissuade attack and artillery deployed along the demilitarized zone
allowing for quick, widespread, economically devastating destruction
of Seoul and environs. Recently, North Korea developed programs
for cyberwarfare and nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional
arms inferiority. The nuclear weapons program is both a direct threat
to the security of the aforementioned alliance partners and a means
for Pyongyang’s leaders to engage in provocative, destabilizing behavior
ranging from attack to proliferation on the Korean peninsula, the
northeast Asian region, and beyond. Indeed, tension in northeast Asia
increased significantly following the nuclear and missile tests in 2016.
2     Chad O’Carroll, “Russia: N. Korean Threats Becoming Legal Grounds for Military Force,”
NK News, March 8, 2016.
3     Bill Gertz, “U.S. Says North Korea Rhetoric a Prelude to Attack,” Washington (DC) Free
Beacon, March 14, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-says-north-korea-rhetoric
-a-prelude-to-attack/.
4     Request statistical output, including descriptive statistics and data files, from the author at the
following e-mail address: mrichey@hufs.ac.kr.
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Under Kim Jong Il during the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s,
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs succeeded in developing
a nuclear warhead and a fissile material production process based on
plutonium removed from the country’s Yŏngbyŏn facility. Additionally,
North Korean scientists pursued, and apparently achieved, weaponsgrade uranium enrichment. The Pyongyang regime also built strategic
and tactical missile and rocket programs. Recently, other improvements to research and testing facilities, launch capabilities, and nuclear
command-and-control have also been observed.
Current consensus on North Korea’s atomic arsenal estimates six
to eight plutonium-based weapons and four to eight uranium-based
bombs.5 Thus the nuclear arsenal is likely 10–16 working devices, with
a retained capacity to produce an unknown number of nuclear weapon
equivalents through plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Pyongyang recently advanced the quality of its nuclear arsenal, focusing
on both yield and size. North Korea claims it detonated a thermonuclear
weapon in the first 2016 test, although most assessments dispute this
assertion, finding a boosted fission bomb more likely. North Korea
also claims to have miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on short-range,
medium-range, intermediate-range, and long-range intercontinental
ballistic missiles—an accomplishment considered realistic according to
independent analysts, US Army General Curtis M. Scaparroti, and the
South Korean government.6
Parallel to its nuclear program, the Pyongyang regime developed
functional missiles and rockets ranging from the reliable Nodong-series
to more unreliable long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
North Korea is also developing road-mobile KN-08 and KN-14 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The country’s thousand-strong missile arsenal is capable of striking
counterforce and countervalue targets on the Korean peninsula, in
Japan, and in the western Pacific. More speculatively, North Korea’s
small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles could likely strike
much of the United States mainland, although experts are skeptical
about the missiles’ reliability and accuracy.7
A functional, miniaturized nuclear warhead combined with delivery
systems gives North Korea a crude nuclear deterrent. Current scenarios
for 2020 predict a low-end estimate of 20 weapons and marginally
improved delivery systems; a medium estimate of 50 weapons, with
emergency operational KN-08s and KN-14s for strategic objectives, and
a variety of missiles (including possibly Musudan intermediate-range
ballistic missiles) for theater objectives; and a high-end estimate of 100
weapons and normally operational KN-08s, KN-14s, and Musudans.8
5     Albright, Future Directions; and Joel S. Wit and Sun Young Ahn, North Korea’s Nuclear
Futures: Technology and Strategy, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures (Washington, DC: US-Korea Institute
at SAIS, 2015).
6     Albright, “North Korean Miniaturization”; Lamothe, “U.S. General”; Choe, “South Korea”;
and Lewis, “Five Things.”
7     Bender, “Nuclear-Capable Missile”; “North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), http://
www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/ (accessed June 10, 2016); and John Schilling, “North
Korea’s Large Rocket Engine Test: A Significant Step Forward for Pyongyang’s ICBM Program,”
38 North, April 11, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/04/schilling041116/.
8     Wit and Sun, “Nuclear Futures.”
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That is, over the last decade Pyongyang has made incremental,
ongoing improvements to its nuclear arsenal, substantially changing the
strategic situation in northeast Asia. Indeed, following the 2016 nuclear
and missile tests, the international community’s response reflected
the significance of the developments with the stiffest sanctions ever
targeting key industries, institutions, and individuals.
The threat of North Korea’s nuclear capability is exacerbated by
confusion about Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. Regime
diplomats confidentially say North Korean leadership regards the nation’s
nuclear deterrent as modeled on mutually assured destruction, which
is a multifariously problematic strategy in the North Korean context.
First, the strike-counterstrike dynamic underlying mutually assured
destruction is absent in the North Korea-United States nuclear dyad, as
Pyongyang lacks credible retaliatory capability. With such a primitively
developed nuclear arsenal, the incentive would be for the regime to use
its weapons before losing them to a putative strike. Second, the regime
has articulated a “no first use” policy and a “defensive use only” policy
while also claiming the right to launch a preemptive nuclear attack if its
deterrent capability or regime survival were threatened.
Uncertainty regarding this doctrine and strategy complicates
attempts to answer even the basic question of why North Korea has
developed a nuclear arsenal at all considering the tremendous cost of
economic and diplomatic isolation. Strategically, the emphasis seems to
be a mixture of political, diplomatic, and military objectives that include
leveraging coercive diplomacy and international negotiations; framing
potential North Korea-South Korea unification favorably; provoking
international tensions on the Korean peninsula to divide the United
States, Japan, South Korea, and China; possessing a deterrent against
conventional attack; and securing the ability to escalate to limited
nuclear conflict in the case of imminent regime collapse to counter loss
in conventional conflict (an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy).9
The latter objective—entailing the use of short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, rather than strategic missiles—
implies a distinction in the Pyongyang regime’s thinking about strategic,
theater, and operational nuclear missiles and therefore the heightened
possibility of making first use of the weapons for tactical (warfighting
efficiency) or “escalation to de-escalate” reasons.10
It is important to recall that the weapons developments outlined
above were accompanied at every step by both conciliatory and coercive
diplomatic engagement by all parties: from North Korea’s accession to
the Nonproliferation Treaty (1985), to the Agreed Framework (1994),
the Four-Party Talks (1997), the Sunshine Policy (1998–2008), withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (2003), and the Six-Party Talks

9     Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation,’ ” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike
-de-escalation; and Shane Smith, North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy, North Korea’s Nuclear
Futures (Washington, DC: US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015).
10     Van Jackson, “Nukes They Can Use: The Danger of North Korea Going Tactical,” 38 North,
March 15, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/vjackson031516/; and Van Jackson, Rival Reputations:
Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Regional Issues in Asia

Richey

97

(2003–9).11 Of course, North Korea claims its weapons programs are a
response to security threats from the United States and its allies. This
stance is certainly reflected in the regime’s domestic and internationally
directed political rhetoric, which, regardless of the level of belligerence,
consistently draws attention to the overall context of hostility in relations
between North Korea and the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

North Korea’s Political Rhetoric

One overarching thread has remained true over the long period of
North Korean nuclear weapons development and the various iterations
of carrot-and-stick diplomacy that have accompanied it: for both the
public at large and the leaderships of the United States, South Korea, and
Japan, threat perceptions of a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea
have been heightened by Pyongyang’s belligerent rhetoric. The regime’s
Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) is infamous for English-language
propaganda ranging from insulting to bellicose to ludicrous.
A few examples include Kim Young-Sam, former South Korean
president, referred to as a “thrice-cursed shabby US toady”; Japan’s government officials “are epileptic mentally deranged wretches”; George
W. Bush, former US president, was a “cowboy buffoon”; South Korean
President Park Geun-Hye “was a venomous swish of skirt”; North Korea
will “turn Seoul into a sea of flame”; the North Korean military will
“mercilessly annihilate the US”; and “Japan is planning nuclear attacks
on the DPRK.”12
Over the study period (1997–2006), North Korea uttered 790 insults
against the United States, South Korea, and Japan; issued 302 threats
against them; and made 130 claims of being under imminent attack by
the alliance partners. The United States was the referent for 788 of these
instances; South Korea, 550; Japan, 96.13
Although the insults and crisis-mongering are problematic because
they raise tensions on the Korean peninsula and undermine diplomacy,
the threats are worse as they foment miscalculation and escalation such
as Lavrov’s aforementioned casus belli. Denny Roy starkly outlines this
as well: “Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program likely increases the
danger that Pyongyang’s brinksmanship could lead to war. . . . With
what they believe is a nuclear deterrent against US or South Korean
attack, North Korea’s leaders may feel emboldened to make more
bellicose threats or to continue carrying out lethal provocations against
11     The Sunshine Policy began in earnest in June 2000 and was comprised of inter-Korean
leadership summits, interministerial meetings, North-South aid, and improved trade and investment.
The policy improved relations between the two Korean states led by Kim Dae-Jung (Republic of
Korea) and Kim Jong Il (North Korea). It remained in effect, despite behavioral evolution by the
two Koreas, until the presidency of Lee Myung-Bak (Republic of Korea) beginning in 2008. The
latter half of the policy period was accompanied by the Six-Party Talks, which focused on halting
and later reversing North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
12     “Shabby Toadyism,” KCNA, June 27, 1997; “Japan’s Bid to Internationalize ‘Abduction
Issues’ under Fire,” KCNA, April 27, 2005; “Bush Administration’s Korea Policy Accused,” KCNA,
April 6, 2003; “Army and People of DPRK Pledge Revenge on Enemies: CPRK Secretariat,” KCNA,
March 29, 2013; “Indignation Meetings of Youth and Students,” KCNA, December 11, 1998;
“Anti-U.S. Sentiment Running High,” KCNA, March 27, 2002; and “Japanese Militarists Criminal
Acts under Fire,” KCNA, December 25, 2006.
13     The author analyzed hyperbolically insulting, threatening, crisis-mongering rhetoric
disseminated in English by the Korean Central News Agency from 1997 to 2006. Articles targeting
multiple countries create inequality between the total instances by rhetoric type (1,222) and target
country (1,334).
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South Korea. This in itself could easily escalate to general war.”14 This
analysis reflects conventional wisdom regarding the North Korean
threat and thus merits examination. In particular, the analysis relies
on the foundational points that intentions matter for threat perception
and that the Pyongyang regime’s intentions can be extrapolated from
its bellicose rhetoric. Can the intentions be extrapolated, however, or
might North Korea’s belligerent international propaganda be a noisy
red herring? Put differently, instead of assuming that this incendiary
messaging is significant, investigate the patterns of English-language
rhetoric produced by the KCNA for international consumption to
determine if it is a meaningful signal.
North Korea’s frequent use of internationally directed belligerent
rhetoric is atypical. There is good reason for this uniqueness: a state’s
regular use of insulting, threatening, bombastic international messaging
has high costs and functions poorly. First, inflammatory rhetoric carries
high audience costs.15 Second, interlocutors increasingly discount their
counterparts’ messages unless diplomatic belligerence and hyperbole are
acted upon. Consequently, making such statements translates into lost
credibility and poor reputations for regimes.
Despite dissuasive reasons, three standard answers purport to
explain why North Korea persists with intemperate rhetoric: the
Pyongyang regime—particularly the Kim leadership circle—is crazy
and acts irrationally; the North Korean leadership does not face audience costs because it is a dictatorship; and the regime does not care about
the loss of international credibility and the degraded reputation arising
from its rhetorical disposition. These responses are mistaken.
First, North Korean leadership is not crazy: it is idiosyncratic—and
predatory—but it is not insane, at least not concerning international
strategy. The proof is in the survival of North Korea’s governing
institutions despite many shocks: the end of the Cold War and loss of
Soviet patronage, the transformation of Chinese economic ideology
(accompanied by Beijing’s calls for North Korea to initiate reforms), two
domestic dynastic transitions, the significant loss of its population due
to famine, the deleterious effects of globalization on the state’s information monopoly, as well as the consequences of international sanctions.
Throughout it all, the leadership in Pyongyang has consistently managed
to wrangle aid from negotiation partners (including the United States,
South Korea, and Japan) in exchange for dubious agreements to halt
its nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, American and South Korean
negotiators speak of the acumen of their North Korean counterparts,
especially given North Korea’s weak bargaining position.
Second, the top Pyongyang leadership does not face audience costs
like those of democratic governments, as totalitarianism undeniably
means even lower audience costs than those of other authoritarian regime
14     Denny Roy, “Strategic Ramifications of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” in The North Korea
Crisis and Regional Responses, ed. Utpal Vyas, Ching-Chang Chen, and Denny Roy (Honolulu, HI: East
West Center, 2015), 66.
15     James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92, doi:10.2307/2944796;
and Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International
Organization 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 35–64, doi:10.1017/S0020818308080028.
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types.16 Nonetheless, even totalitarian regimes have factional fighting,
and the North Korean inner circle potentially does face audience costs
(e.g., the military has both the means to effect change via a coup and
an organizational/cultural disposition biased toward strategically sound
kinetic action) for unrealized belligerent rhetoric. Moreover, invoking
audience costs involves merely a permissive reason for belligerent
rhetoric, not an obligation. In the case of North Korea, the fact of its low
audience costs cannot positively explain why it engages in such rhetoric
(but rather only that it lacks a political factor that would incentivize it
not to engage in such rhetoric).
Third, North Korean leadership is concerned about its international
reputation. Indeed, North Korea maintains a significant, constructive presence in numerous international organizations such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum; the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the World
Health Organization; and the International Maritime Organization.
High-ranking defectors report that North Korea’s leadership is sensitive
to its international image, and the country’s nuclear, missile, and rocket
development projects partially aim at securing internal regime legitimacy by gaining external respect for deterrence capabilities.17 In fact,
there are several possible reasons why North Korea diffuses insulting,
bellicose, hyperbolically crisis-mongering English-language propaganda
internationally. The author tested three particularly relevant possibilities
for understanding Pyongyang’s rhetorical hostility as well as informing
policies and positions regarding North Korea.
First, such rhetoric may be a strategy for negotiations occurring
during such meetings as the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean ministerial
meetings (such as the Sunshine Policy), and Japan-North Korea normalization talks. Hypothesis 1 (H1) represented increased belligerent
rhetoric from North Korea corresponding with negotiation sessions
of major diplomatic efforts as a tactic for extracting better terms of a
potential deal. Hypothesis 1A (H1A) represented decreased belligerent
rhetoric from North Korea corresponding with major diplomatic negotiation sessions as a sign of genuine détente.
The second possibility considered North Korea’s rhetoric to be a
functional response to perceived threats from adversaries, particularly
the United States and South Korea. Hypothesis 2 (H2) posited increased
belligerent rhetoric from North Korea corresponding to major US-led
military exercises involving South Korea or Japan as well as US overseas
military operations Pyongyang perceived as threatening. This response
would indicate escalation tolerance. Hypothesis 2A (H2A) posited
decreased belligerent rhetoric from North Korea corresponding to the
aforementioned threatening US military activity as an indication of
genuine fear of or irritation with counterparty aggression.
Third, the belligerent rhetoric may be a coordinated complement to
North Korea’s provocations, such as nuclear and missile tests or attacks
on South Korea. Hypothesis 3 (H3) postulated increased belligerent
16     Weeks, “Audience Costs.”
17     Jang Jin-sung, Dear Leader: My Escape from North Korea (New York: First 37 Ink / Atria Books,
2015); and Eric Ballbach, “Producing Boundaries: Identity and North Korean Foreign Policy”
(dissertation, Universität Trier, Germany, 2016).
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rhetoric from North Korea corresponding to its provocations as a
strategic signal of escalation tolerance and an associated deterrent effect
with respect to the United States, South Korea, or Japan. Hypothesis
3A (H3A) postulated decreased belligerent rhetoric from North
Korea corresponding to its provocations as a strategic signal that the
provocation-rhetoric cycle is an overture to diplomacy.
An analysis of insulting, threatening, hyperbolic rhetoric in
English-language news articles disseminated over the period 1997–2006
via the Korea Central News Agency and targeting the United States,
South Korea, and Japan is instructive with respect to these hypotheses.
During this period, belligerent rhetorical statements in the articles
trended downwards overall. Insults and threats diminished marginally,
while statements claiming North Korea was imminently under attack
by the United States, South Korea, or Japan, which compose a small
number of total observations, clearly increased. The decline in rhetoric
directed against South Korea roughly coincided with an increase against
the United States and the initiation of the Sunshine Policy. Curiously,
despite efforts at multilateral diplomacy, North Korean rhetoric claiming
imminent attack by the United States, South Korea, and Japan increased
by 170 percent after 2000.
An ordinary least squares regression shows that the two major
diplomatic efforts initiated by the international community—the Sunshine
Policy and the Six-Party Talks—have a statistically significant, negative
correlation with North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric. In other words,
diplomatic efforts are associated with a lower probability of inflammatory
rhetoric by the Pyongyang regime (see table 1). The reverse occurs—
bellicose rhetoric increases—when Pyongyang’s leaders consider
American and South Korean actions aggressive.
Two classes of events are important: US overseas military
operations, or expressions of hawkishness potentially leading to
operations, that might indicate Washington’s appetite for strikes against
rogue states like North Korea and US-led military exercises in the AsiaPacific, particularly exercises involving the United States and South
Korea. These two “US hawkishness” variables explain 20 percent of
the variation in North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric. This is less than the
independent variables indexing conciliation, but the coefficients are
larger, which indicates greater effect intensity.
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Corresponding
Hypothesis

Six-Party Talks

Aggregate
Rhetoric

0.490

-0.211 (<0.01)

H1A

Sunshine Policy

Aggregate
Rhetoric

0.094

-0.148 (<0.01)

H1A

US Military
Operations

Aggregate
Rhetoric

0.130

0.370 (<0.01)

H2

US-led Exercises

Aggregate
Rhetoric

0.070

0.142 (<0.05)

H2

North Korean
Provocations

Aggregate
Rhetoric

0.030

0.090 (>0.10)

H3/H3A

North Korean
Provocations

Threat
Rhetoric

0.030

0.030 (>0.10)

H3/H3A

North Korean
Provocations

North Korea as
Attack Target
Rhetoric

0.004

0.008 (>0.10)

H3/H3A

Table 1. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and independent variables

Most people only notice North Korea during episodes in which
Pyongyang executes some form of provocation, such as nuclear bomb or
ballistic missile tests, artillery bombardments of South Korean islands,
attacks on South Korean navy vessels, and violent incursions on the
southern side of the military demarcation line. Media reports about and
government reactions to such actions are overwhelmingly accompanied
by references to North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric, particularly the
threats. But is the incendiary rhetoric meaningfully associated with
provocations, or does Pyongyang’s intemperate rhetoric merely appear
correlated because popular attention focuses on the Korean peninsula
only during such incidents?
The data presented in table 1 suggest the latter is the case, as indeed
there is no statistically significant relationship between North Korea’s
provocations and belligerent rhetoric. This perceived correlation, as
opposed to actual correlation, is true of all types of belligerent rhetoric
taken together as well as threats and claims of imminent attack against
North Korea taken individually.

Conclusion

The least surprising and least policy-relevant result of this
study is the correlation between American-led military exercises
and North Korean bellicose rhetoric. There was already a strong
presumption of this phenomenon, although the effect is small, and
American decision-makers are disinclined to cancel or alter military
exercises in northeast Asia due to Pyongyang’s predictable rhetorical
response. More significant is the result relating North Korea’s inflammatory rhetoric to US operations overseas and their related activities.
One might expect North Korea to employ more sober rhetoric vis-à-vis
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events such as the beginning of the Iraq War or axis-of-evil speeches,
a risk-averse approach counting on status quo inertia to prevail. Yet
the opposite is the case, as the Pyongyang leadership is relatively
tolerant of escalating risk, increasing its bellicose rhetoric when the
United States shows aggressiveness. North Korean leaders appear
genuinely afraid of possible US attacks and send signals internationally that they are prepared to fight. One speculates that North Korea
counts on US and global media to disseminate its messages in the
hopes of deterring American leaders from seriously considering
an attack that much of the US population would not support because it
would be afraid of an “aggressive,” “crazy” adversary.
The results concerning North Korea’s provocations are interesting,
even counterintuitive, as Pyongyang’s aggression and weapons testing
seemingly coincide with heightened bellicose rhetoric that forms a
multidimensional crescendo of saber rattling. The intemperate
rhetorical aspect of the artful saber rattling, however, is a noisy red
herring. North Korea’s indulgence in belligerent rhetoric, as much during
provocative episodes as during other times, fails to support the ideas of
the remaining hypotheses: namely, the messages serve as a coordinated
complement, either positively or negatively correlated, to other North
Korean provocations. The scholars and foreign policy practitioners who
posit North Korean rhetoric during provocation periods is an escalation
risk, an invitation for misperception, and a possible casus belli are
correct. But the lesson of this study is that, absent other corroborating
signs of belligerence, we can and should prevent misperception and
miscalculation by discounting such rhetoric.
Why does the Pyongyang regime use belligerent rhetoric so
frequently? It may be that employing such messaging is a strategic
choice to create a pervasive sense of an irrational and thus uniquely
unpredictable and dangerous regime in the consciousness of other states
and the international community. Another possibility is that North
Korea’s intemperate rhetoric is misinformation clouding perceptions of
its domestic and international activities: it is a form of psychological
warfare obscuring Pyongyang’s objectives.
This interpretation has some support from high-ranking North
Korean defectors who report the nation’s diplomacy is inextricably
linked to psychological warfare.18 Finally, perhaps the consistent use of
inflammatory rhetoric is part of a strategy to have a cheap bargaining
chip to play in relations with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and
the international community in general. Pyongyang’s leaders can, for
example, agree to calm the rhetoric when necessary to promote goodwill
with interlocutors.

Recommendations

Considering all of the above, several policy recommendations
emerge. First, US civilian and military decision-makers should greatly
discount North Korea’s threat rhetoric unless it is accompanied by other
signs of bellicosity that would lend credibility to the hostile statements.
The importance of this judiciousness is particularly true when assessing
18     Jang, Dear Leader.
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Pyongyang’s threat rhetoric surrounding its provocations, as there is no
statistical evidence connecting the threats to actual kinetic attacks.
Second, US civilian and military decision-makers should make
sustained efforts—both during North Korean crises and otherwise—
to communicate with US journalists, especially those specializing in
security affairs, to clarify the nature of the regime in Pyongyang and
how it uses hostile rhetoric. This media influence would lessen alarmist
coverage about North Korean rhetoric. Public diplomacy should also
include efforts to place civilian and military interviewees on media
outlets not only to diffuse fear but to attach names and faces to the
messages. Both cases would ideally facilitate a calmer debate about
various policy advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to
North Korean threats.
Third, negotiators in the international community can assume,
absent contrary evidence, diplomatic negotiations in which Pyongyang
diminishes its hostile rhetoric are negotiations that the regime takes
seriously. The converse is also true: if Pyongyang does not make
that sign of good faith, then it is not likely to treat the negotiations
seriously. Moreover, negotiators should not accept the North Korean
offer to diminish hostile rhetoric as a meaningful first step in any
diplomatic process. As the statistical evidence shows, this is a step North
Korea is likely to take anyway, so there is no reason to grant them the
virtue of a necessity.
Fourth, Pyongyang’s threat rhetoric mostly has the character of
“redlines,” such as when the “US encroaches even [by] .001 millimeter”
North Korea “will mercilessly destroy the aggressors.”19 Often redlines
are intended to be dissuasive or fix limits to a putative future commitment to counter action should the redline be violated, but they can
indirectly and unintentionally encourage an adversary’s behavior below
the threshold.20 That is, redlines can send a message that action below
the threshold is not unacceptable. It is a way of articulating some action is
unacceptable, and although a similar action is also disliked, allowing
it serves as a token of good faith that the unacceptable action will not
occur, which would, in fact, result in unfavorable consequences.
In the case of North Korea and its adversaries, particularly the
United States and South Korea, this scenario fits North Korea’s
discourse and actions with respect to US-led military exercises. No
one doubts that Pyongyang hates the drills (as they oblige North
Korea to mobilize its own troops to combat readiness status, which is
inconvenient and expensive), but paradoxically, North Korea’s
hypothetical, hyperbolic threats against the US-led exercises may
function to send a message that the Kim regime is willing to accept the
practice, as long as there is reassurance of the action’s limit: the military
exercise will not immediately threaten North Korea’s sovereign territory
or leadership survival.

19     The Korea Central News Agency published several articles illustrating Korea’s redlines on
December 4, 1998; July 28, 2001; May 2, 2002; September 29, 2003; April 8, 2006; November 28,
2008; March 14, 2010; and May 21, 2014.
20     Bruno Tertrais, “Drawing Red Lines Right,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 7–24,
doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.978433.
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Finally, the fact that declines in North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric
correlate with negotiation periods, such as the Sunshine Policy and
Six-Party Talks, presents a policy conundrum. Call it the Sunshine
Paradox: on the one hand, lower levels of North Korean belligerent
rhetoric are desirable, as they translate into lower escalation risk; on
the other hand, the lower levels of belligerent rhetoric from Pyongyang
during the study period (1997–2006) coincided with the regime’s seminal
success developing a nuclear arsenal.
Perhaps North Korea’s rhetorical strategy during this period was,
consistent with buying time through Sunshine Policy-era negotiations, a
disguise on its true objectives. This prospect casts a pall over the value
of détente, both rhetorical and otherwise. There is a possibility of a
trade-off: lower North Korean rhetoric, and thus lower escalation
risk with the burgeoning nuclear power, could be achieved through
resuming negotiations, but the cost would be that the United States and
its northeast Asian allies would face the possibility that Pyongyang’s
leaders would use the opportunity to advance their nuclear weapons
arsenal. Weighing costs and benefits of the two courses would be
challenging.

